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Pro-social punishment is a key driver of harmonious and stable society. However, this
institution is vulnerable to corruption since law-violators can avoid sanctioning by pay-
ing bribes to corrupt law-enforcers. Consequently, to understand how altruistic behavior
survives in a corrupt environment is an open question. To reveal potential explanations
here we introduce corrupt enforcers and violators into the public goods game with pool
punishment, and assume that punishers, as corrupt enforcers, may select defectors prob-
abilistically to take a bribe from, and meanwhile defectors, as corrupt violators, may
select punishers stochastically to be corrupted. By means of mathematical analysis, we
aim to study the necessary conditions for the evolution of cooperation in such corrupt
environment. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population in two
distinct ways. First, cooperators, defectors, and punishers can coexist by all keeping a
steady fraction of the population. Second, these three strategies can form a cyclic domi-
nance that resembles a rock-scissors-paper cycle or a heteroclinic cycle. We theoretically
identify conditions when the competing strategies coexist in a stationary way or they
dominate each other in a cyclic way. These predictions are confirmed numerically.
Keywords: Pro-social punishment; Corruption; Bribery; Replicator dynamics; Hetero-
clinic cycle.
AMS Subject Classification: 91A22, 91A13, 91B18
1. Introduction
Understanding the emergence and persistence of altruistic behavior among self-
ish individuals has long been an enormous challenge for research commu-
nity.3,12,15,17,40,47,48,56,60 This conundrum of collective behaviors has been of-
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ten studied in social-economical systems where different mathematical tools in-
cluding the kinetic theory of active particles and agent based modeling can be
used.2,5–9,16,21,26,38 As an alternative approach, evolutionary game theory has also
been applied to model individuals interactions at a microscopic scale for understand-
ing the dynamics of collective actions of cooperation in large systems of interacting
entities.20,41,42,49,55,62–64 Particularly, public goods game (PGG), as a standard
metaphor of the mentioned social dilemma, has attracted a lot of attention from
broad range of research disciplines.23,25,27,34,57,68 In the PGG, individuals decide
whether to contribute to the common pool or not, and the accumulated and en-
hanced contribution are distributed to group members equally. Thus defectors who
contribute nothing will obtain a higher payoff, no matter what other players do. If
left controlled, each individual prefers to defect in the game leading to the collapse
of cooperation.22
In order to solve the problem of cooperation in the game, an intensive research
efforts have been carried out during the past few decades.13,19,36,46,50,58 One promi-
nently discussed solution is the employment of pro-social punishment, that is, pun-
ishing uncooperative individuals by lowering their income.11,14,32,33,44,51,54,59,61,69
In particular, two different ways of punishment are studied, namely, peer punish-
ment and pool punishment. The former refers to that group individuals can impose
fines on the violators directly and its additional cost.4,18,44 The latter means that
players can decide whether to contribute to a punishment pool before contributing
to the common pool of the basic game and sanctioning defection is organized cen-
trally.52,61 This way of punishment is widespread and generally preferred in modern
human societies.52
While punishment can solve the original dilemma of cooperation, the effective-
ness of punishment in promoting cooperation has been challenged by recent theoret-
ical research showing that the existence of corruption where defectors bribe corrupt
officials to avoid punishment can destroy the positive consequence of costly punish-
ment in cooperation.1,29,31,35,66 For example, Muthukrishna et al.35 experimentally
showed that the possibility of corruption can cause a significant fall in public good
provisioning and make empowering leaders decrease cooperative contributions.
It is worth mentioning that in most of the studies involving corruption, it is
always assumed that defectors bribe corrupt enforcers and meanwhile enforcers who
are involved with corruption take the bribes permanently. Indeed this assumption
is not always justified in realistic situations where officials who are involved in
corruption do not accept all the offered bribes and meanwhile civilians who violate
the rules are not always going to offer a bribe to the officials. In other words,
corrupt officials and defective civilians may act stochastically and offer or take
bribes occasionally.
Motivated by the above mentioned observations, in this work we thus introduce
corrupt enforcers and violators into the PGG with pool punishment, and we assume
that defectors bribe enforcers probabilistically to avoid punishment and meanwhile
pool punishers accept a bribe from defectors also stochastically. By applying the
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replicator equation approach we assume infinite population where the evolutionary
game dynamics is used. Our theoretical analysis reveals, which is also confirmed
by numerical calculations, that the cooperative behavior can be maintained in the
population in two different ways. First, cooperators, defectors, and punishers can
coexist where the portions of all strategies are stable in time. Alternatively, the
three strategies can dominate each other in a cyclic way similarly to the well known
rock-scissors-paper cycle or the heteroclinic cycle.
2. Model and method
2.1. Public goods game
We consider the PGG played in an infinite well-mixed population. At each time
step, N individuals are randomly chosen to form a group to participate in the PGG.
Each individual can choose to cooperate or defect. Cooperators (C) contribute to
the common pool at a cost c, while defectors (D) contribute nothing. The sum of
contributions is multiplied by a factor r (1 < r < N) and then the enhanced amount
is divided equally among all group members.
We then introduce a third strategist, pool punishers (P ), who contributeG to the
punishment pool before contributing c to the common pool. They are responsible for
monitoring the entire population and punishing those individuals who are unwilling
to contribute to the common pool. Alternatively, some defectors might be tempted
to bribe the enforcers, so as to enable them to avoid punishment. In the same way,
some enforcers can choose to accept bribes and do not punish the bribers. Here
we assume that punishers decide to accept the bribe b from corrupt defectors with
probability p. With 1 − p probability they do not accept any bribes and punish
defectors in the group. On the other hand, we assume that defector will pay the
cost h to bribe the corrupt punishers with probability q, while with 1−q probability
they are unwilling to do this. Thus, a defector who does not bribe will receive a
fine B(B ≥ h) from every punisher no matter whether he/she is willing to accept
bribes.
As a result, the payoffs of cooperators, defectors, and punishers from one PGG
can be respectively written as
piC =
rc(NC +NP + 1)
N
− c, (2.1)
piD =
rc(NC +NP )
N
− (1− pq)BNP − pqNPh, (2.2)
piP =
rc(NC +NP + 1)
N
− c−G+ pqNDb, (2.3)
where NC , ND, and NP respectively represent the number of cooperators, defectors,
and pool punishers among the other N − 1 group members, and (1− pq)B denotes
the expected fine from each punisher.
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2.2. Replicator equation
We apply replicator equations to study the evolutionary dynamics of strategies
in our model.28,37,49,67 We denote by x, y, and z the frequencies of C,D, and P ,
respectively. Thus, x, y, z ≥ 0 and x+y+z = 1. The replicator equations are written
as 
x˙ = x(PC − P¯ ),
y˙ = y(PD − P¯ ),
z˙ = z(PP − P¯ ),
(2.4)
where PC , PD, and PP denote the expected payoffs of C,D, and P , respectively, and
P¯ = xPC+yPD+zPP gives the average payoff of the entire population. Accordingly,
the expected payoffs of the above three strategies can be written as
Pi =
N−1∑
NC=0
N−NC−1∑
ND=0
(
N − 1
NC
)(
N −NC − 1
ND
)
xNCyNDzN−NC−ND−1pii, (2.5)
where i = C,D, or P .
In the next section, we examine the evolutionary dynamics for the mentioned
three strategies. Particulary, we analyze the distribution and stability of equilibrium
points in the following section.
3. Theoretical analysis
3.1. Equilibrium points
We consider the replicator dynamics for cooperators (C), defectors (D), and pool
punishers (P ), with the frequencies x, y, and z, respectively. We can get the expected
payoffs of these three strategies by simplifying the formula presented in Eq. (2.5)
as follows:
PC =
rc
N
(N − 1)(x+ z) + rc
N
− c, (3.1)
PD =
rc
N
(N − 1)(x+ z)− (1− pq)B(N − 1)z − pq(N − 1)zh, (3.2)
PP =
rc
N
(N − 1)(x+ z) + rc
N
− c−G+ pq(N − 1)yb, (3.3)
where (N − 1)(x + z) denotes the expected numbers of contributors among the
N −1 co-players, and B(N −1)z gives the expected fine on a defector. The detailed
analysis of the equilibrium points is shown in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. The system described by (2.4) has at most five equilibria (x, y, z) =
(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1 − α, α), and (1 − β − µ, µ, β). Here we introduce the
abbreviation α = rc/N−c−G+pq(N−1)b(B+b−h)(N−1)pq−B(N−1) , β =
c−rc/N
(1−pq)B(N−1)+pqh(N−1) , and µ =
G
pq(N−1)b .
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Proof. It is easy to obtain the three vertex fixed points of the above system,
namely, (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), and (0, 1, 0). In the following, we analyze the boundary
and interior equilibria of the system in detail.
We first investigate the interior equilibrium points in the simplex S3. Solving
PC = PD results in z = β. Similarly, by solving PC = PP , we have y = µ. Thus,
there is an interior equilibrium point (1 − β − µ, µ, β) when µ < 1, β < 1, and
1− β − µ > 0.
Then we investigate the fixed points on each edge of the simplex S3. On the
edge CD we have z = 0, resulting in y˙ = y(1− y)(PD −PC) = y(1− y)(c− rcN ) > 0.
As a result, the system evolves from the C state towards the D state.
On the CP edge we have y = 0, resulting in x˙ = x(1−x)(PC−PP ) = x(1−x)G >
0. Thus the direction of the dynamics goes from P toward C state.
On the DP edge we have y + z = 1, and the replicator system changes to
z˙ = z(1 − z)(PP − PD). Solving PP = PD results in z = α. Thus there exists a
boundary equilibrium point (0, 1− α, α) when 0 < α < 1.
3.2. Stability analysis of equilibria
Here we set that{
f(x, y) = x[(1− x)(PC − PP )− y(PD − PP )],
g(x, y) = y[(1− y)(PD − PP )− x(PC − PP )].
(3.4)
Then the Jacobian of the system is
J =
[
∂f(x,y)
∂x
∂f(x,y)
∂y
∂g(x,y)
∂x
∂g(x,y)
∂y
]
, (3.5)
where
∂f(x, y)
∂x
= [(1− x)(PC − PP )− y(PD − PP )] + x[−(PC − PP )
+ (1− x) ∂
∂x
(PC − PP )− y ∂
∂x
(PD − PP )],
∂f(x, y)
∂y
= x[(1− x) ∂
∂y
(PC − PP )− (PD − PP )− y ∂
∂y
(PD − PP )],
∂g(x, y)
∂x
= y[(1− y) ∂
∂x
(PD − PP )− (PC − PP )− x ∂
∂x
(PC − PP )],
∂g(x, y)
∂y
= [(1− y)(PD − PP )− x(PC − PP )] + y[−(PD − PP )
+ (1− y) ∂
∂y
(PD − PP )− x ∂
∂y
(PC − PP )].
(3.6)
In the following, we study the stabilities of equilibria based on whether the
system has an interior equilibrium point.
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3.2.1. The system (2.4) has an interior equilibrium point
When β < 1, µ < 1, and β + µ < 1, there exists an interior fixed point, namely,
(x, y, z) = (1 − β − µ, µ, β). In the following we discuss the stability of this fixed
point.
When (1− pq)B + pqh− pqb < 0, the existing interior fixed point is stable.
(1) For 0 < α < 1, there is a boundary equilibrium point with z = α on the
DP edge. Thus the system has five fixed points in the parameter space, namely,
(0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 1− α, α), and (1− β − µ, µ, β).
For (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), the Jacobian is
J =
[
G 0
0 −(1− pq)B(N − 1)− pq(N − 1)h− rcN + c+G
]
, (3.7)
thus the fixed equilibrium is unstable since G > 0.
For (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0), the Jacobian is
J =
[−G −(c+G− rcN )
0 c− rcN
]
, (3.8)
thus the fixed equilibrium is unstable since r < N .
For (x, y, z) = (0, 1, 0), the Jacobian is
J =
[
rc
N − c 0
−(G− pq(N − 1)b) rcN − c−G+ pq(N − 1)b
]
, (3.9)
thus the fixed equilibrium is a saddle point and unstable since rcN − c−G+ pq(N −
1)b > 0.
For (x, y, z) = (0, 1− α, α), the Jacobian is
J =
[
a11 0
a21 a22
]
, (3.10)
where a11 = G − pq(N − 1)yb, a21 = y(1 − y)[pq(N − 1)h + (1 − pq)(N − 1)B] −
y[G − pq(N − 1)yb], and a22 = y(1 − y)(N − 1)[(1 − pq)B + pqh − pqb], thus the
fixed equilibrium is unstable since G− pq(N − 1)yb > 0.
For (x, y, z) = (1 − β − µ, µ, β), we define the equilibrium point as (x∗, y∗, z∗)
hereafter, thus the elements in the Jacobian matrix are written as
∂f
∂x
(x∗, y∗) = x∗[(1− x∗) ∂
∂x
(PC − PP )− y∗ ∂
∂x
(PD − PP )],
∂f
∂y
(x∗, y∗) = x∗[(1− x∗) ∂
∂y
(PC − PP )− y∗ ∂
∂y
(PD − PP )],
∂g
∂x
(x∗, y∗) = y∗[(1− y∗) ∂
∂x
(PD − PP )− x∗ ∂
∂x
(PC − PP )],
∂g
∂y
(x∗, y∗) = y∗[(1− y∗) ∂
∂y
(PD − PP )− x∗ ∂
∂y
(PC − PP )],
(3.11)
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where 
∂
∂x
(PC − PP ) = 0,
∂
∂y
(PC − PP ) = −pq(N − 1)b,
∂
∂x
(PD − PP ) = (N − 1)[pqh+ (1− pq)B],
∂
∂y
(PD − PP ) = (N − 1)[pqh+ (1− pq)B − pqb].
(3.12)
Then we define that p = ∂f∂x (x
∗, y∗)∂g∂y (x
∗, y∗) − ∂f∂y (x∗, y∗) ∂g∂x (x∗, y∗) and q =
∂f
∂x (x
∗, y∗) + ∂g∂y (x
∗, y∗). Thus we have
p =
∂f
∂x
(x∗, y∗)
∂g
∂y
(x∗, y∗)− ∂f
∂y
(x∗, y∗)
∂g
∂x
(x∗, y∗)
= x∗y∗(1− x∗ − y∗)[ ∂
∂x
(PC − PP ) ∂
∂y
(PD − PP )
− ∂
∂y
(PC − PP ) ∂
∂x
(PD − PP )]
= x∗y∗(1− x∗ − y∗)(N − 1)2pqb[pqh+ (1− pq)B]
> 0, (3.13)
and
q =
∂f
∂x
(x∗, y∗) +
∂g
∂y
(x∗, y∗)
= x∗(1− x∗) ∂
∂x
(PC − PP ) + y∗(1− y∗) ∂
∂y
(PD − PP )
− x∗y∗[ ∂
∂x
(PD − PP ) + ∂
∂y
(PC − PP )]
= (N − 1)[(1− pq)B + pqh− pqb]y∗(1− y∗ − x∗). (3.14)
Consequently for (1− pq)B + pqh− pqb < 0 the interior fixed point is stable.
(2) For α ≤ 0 or α ≥ 1, the boundary equilibrium point of the DP edge does not
exist. Thus the system has four fixed points in the parameter space. The stability
of (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), and (1− β−µ, µ, β) will not change, compared with the case of
0 < α < 1. If α ≥ 1, the fixed point (0, 1, 0) is unstable since the largest eigenvalue
of J(0, 1, 0) is positive. If α < 0, the fixed point (0, 1, 0) is stable. Particularly, for
α = 0 we can prove that this fixed point is unstable by using the center manifold
theorem10,30 (see Theorem.3.2).
Theorem 3.2. When rcN −c−G+pq(N−1)b = 0, the fixed point (0, 1, 0) is unstable.
Proof. Because of y = 1− x− z, the dynamic equations (3.4) become{
x˙ = x[(1− x)(PC − PD)− z(PP − PD)],
z˙ = z[(1− z)(PP − PD)− x(PC − PD)],
(3.15)
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where
PC − PD = rc
N
− c+ (1− pq)B(N − 1)z + (N − 1)pqzh, (3.16)
PP − PD = rc
N
− c−G+ pq(N − 1)(1− x− z)b
+ (1− pq)B(N − 1)z + pq(N − 1)zh. (3.17)
We know that (x, z) = (0, 0) is an equilibrium point of the equation system
(3.15). Consequently the Jacobian is
A =
[
rc
N − c 0
0 rcN − c−G+ pq(N − 1)b
]
. (3.18)
When rcN − c − G + pq(N − 1)b = 0, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian for the fixed
point (x, z) = (0, 0) are 0 and rcN − c. In this condition, we study the stability of the
equilibrium point by further using the center manifold theorem.30 To do that, we
construct a matrix M , whose column elements are the eigenvectors of the matrix
A, given as
M =
[
0 1
1 0
]
. (3.19)
Let T = M−1, then we have
TAT−1 =
[
0 0
0 rcN − c
]
. (3.20)
Using variable substitution, we have[
v
u
]
= T
[
x
z
]
=
[
0 1
1 0
] [
x
z
]
=
[
z
x
]
. (3.21)
Therefore, the system (3.15) can be rewritten as
v˙ = v(1− v)[rc
N
− c−G+ pq(N − 1)(1− u− v)b+ (1− pq)B(N − 1)v
+ pq(N − 1)vh]− vu[rc
N
− c+ (1− pq)B(N − 1)v + (N − 1)pqvh],
u˙ = u(1− u)[rc
N
− c+ (1− pq)B(N − 1)v + (N − 1)pqvh]− vu[rc
N
− c
−G+ pq(N − 1)(1− u− v)b+ (1− pq)B(N − 1)v + pq(N − 1)vh].
Using the center manifold theorem,10,30 we have that u = e(v) is a center mani-
fold for the above system. Then the dynamics on the center manifold, namely, the
dynamics of
v˙ = v(1− v)[rc
N
− c−G+ pq(N − 1)(1− e(v)− v)b+ (1− pq)B(N − 1)v
+ pq(N − 1)vh]− ve(v)[rc
N
− c+ (1− pq)B(N − 1)v + (N − 1)pqvh], (3.22)
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determine the dynamics near the equilibrium point. Assuming that e(v) = O(|v|2),
thus the system (3.22) can be expressed as
v˙ = (v2 − v3)[−pq(N − 1)b+ (1− pq)(N − 1)B + pq(N − 1)h] +O(|v|4).(3.23)
Since −pq(N − 1)b+ (1− pq)(N − 1)B+ pq(N − 1)h 6= 0, thus we obtain that v = 0
is unstable. Accordingly, the fixed point (0, 1, 0) is unstable in the equation system
(2.4).
Next we study the case when (1− pq)B+ pqh− pqb = 0. Here the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian matrix for the interior equilibrium point are pure imaginary. Besides,
the boundary equilibrium point of the DP edge does not exist. Hence the system
has four fixed points in the parameter space, namely, (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), and
(1−β−µ, µ, β). The three vertexes are unstable since the largest eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrices of these three fixed points are all positive.
Theorem 3.3. When (1−pq)B+pqh−pqb = 0, the interior fixed point is a center
surrounding by periodic closed orbits.
Proof. We introduce a new variable ε = xx+y , which represents the fraction of
cooperators among individuals who do not contribute to the punishment pool. This
yields
ε˙ =
xy
(x+ y)2
(PC − PD) = −ε(1− ε)(PD − PC). (3.24)
On the other hand, z˙ = z(PP − P¯ ), where
P¯ = xPC + yPD + zPP
= x(PC − PD) + (1− z)(PD − PP ) + PP . (3.25)
Thus we have
z˙ = z[x(PD − PC)− (1− z)(PD − PP )]. (3.26)
Accordingly the equation system becomes
ε˙ = ε(1− ε)[rc
N
− c+ (1− pq)B(N − 1)z + (N − 1)pqzh],
z˙ = z(1− z){(1− ε)[rc
N
− c+ pq(N − 1)(1− z)b
+ (1− pq)B(N − 1)z + pq(N − 1)zh]−G}.
The separability of the factors allows us to write
dz
dε
=
z(1− z)
rc
N − c+ (1− pq)B(N − 1)z + (N − 1)pqzh
(1− ε)[ rcN − c+ pq(N − 1)b]−G
ε(1− ε) ,
such that ∫ rc
N − c+ (1− pq)B(N − 1)z + (N − 1)pqzh
z(1− z) dz
=
∫
(1− ε)[ rcN − c+ pq(N − 1)b]−G
ε(1− ε) dε. (3.27)
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The integral of the right-hand side is
[
rc
N
− c+ pq(N − 1)b] log(ε)−G[log(ε)− log(1− ε)]. (3.28)
The integral of the left-hand side is
(
rc
N
− c)[log(z)− log(1− z)]− [(1− pq)B(N − 1)
+(N − 1)pqh] log(1− z). (3.29)
In this way, we identify the constant of motion
H(ε, z) = [
rc
N
− c+ pq(N − 1)b] log(ε)−G[log(ε)− log(1− ε)]
+ (
rc
N
− c)[log(z)− log(1− z)]− [(1− pq)B(N − 1)
+ (N − 1)pqh] log(1− z). (3.30)
Therefore, we have
H˙ =
∂H
∂ε
ε˙+
∂H
∂z
z˙ = 0. (3.31)
Accordingly, the system is conservative and all constant level sets of H correspond
to closed curves. Besides, the interior fixed point is neutrally stable surrounded by
those closed and periodic orbits.
Last, when (1−pq)B+pqh−pqb > 0, the existing interior fixed point is unstable.
(1) For 0 < α < 1, there is a boundary equilibrium point on the DP
edge. Then the system has five fixed points in the parameter space, namely,
(0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 1− α, α), and (1− β − µ, µ, β).
The fixed points (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), and (0, 1 − α, α) are all unstable since the
largest eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrices are all positive.
For (x, y, z) = (0, 1, 0), the Jacobian is
J =
[
rc
N − c 0
−(G− pq(N − 1)b) rcN − c−G+ pq(N − 1)b
]
, (3.32)
thus this is a stable equilibrium point since rcN − c−G+ pq(N − 1)b < 0.
(2) For α ≤ 0 or α ≥ 1, the boundary equilibrium point of the DP edge does not
exist. Thus the system has four fixed points in the mentioned parameter space. The
stability of (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), and (1 − β − µ, µ, β) will not change, compared with
the case of 0 < α < 1. If α ≥ 1, the fixed point (0, 1, 0) is stable since the largest
eigenvalue of J(0, 1, 0) is positive. If α ≤ 0, the fixed point (0, 1, 0) is unstable.
Theorem 3.4. When rcN − c−G > max{−(N − 1)[(1− pq)B+ pqh],−pq(N − 1)b}
and r < N , there is a stable heteroclinic cycle on the boundary of the simplex S3.
Proof. When rcN − c − G > max{−(N − 1)[(1 − pq)B + pqh],−pq(N − 1)b} and
r < N , we know that the three vertex equilibrium points (C,D, and P ) are all saddle
nodes, and the three edges (CD,DP , and PC) are the heteroclinic trajectories. All
October 29, 2019 1:53 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE manuscript˙28-19-10
Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population 11
of these guarantee the existence of the heteroclinic cycle on the boundary S3. In
the following, we will prove that the heteroclinic cycle is asymptotically stable.
Based on the above analysis, we can get the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrices
of the three vertex equilibrium points, namely, λ−P = −(N − 1)[(1− pq)B + pqh]−
( rcN − c−G), λ+P = G,λ−C = −G,λ+C = c− rcN , λ−D = rcN − c, and λ+D = rcN − c−G+
pq(N − 1)b, respectively. Then we respectively define that λP = −λ
−
P
λ+P
, λC = −λ
−
C
λ+C
,
and λD = −λ
−
D
λ+D
, and we have λ = λPλCλD =
rc
N −c−G+(N−1)[(1−pq)B+pqh]
rc
N −c−G+pq(N−1)b . When
(1 − pq)B + pq(h − b) > 0, we have λ > 1. Therefore the heteroclinic cycle is
asymptotically stable.39
3.2.2. There is no interior equilibrium point in the system (2.4)
When β ≥ 1, or µ ≥ 1, or β + µ ≥ 1, the interior fixed point does not exist.
(1) For 0 < α < 1, there is a boundary equilibrium point on the DP
edge. Then the system has four fixed points in the parameter space, namely,
(0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), and (0, 1− α, α).
The fixed points (0, 0, 1) and (1, 0, 0) are both unstable since the largest eigen-
values of Jacobian matrices are both positive.
For (x, y, z) = (0, 1, 0), the Jacobian is
J =
[
rc
N − c 0
−(G− pq(N − 1)b) rcN − c−G+ pq(N − 1)b
]
, (3.33)
thus the fixed equilibrium is a saddle point and unstable when rcN − c−G+ pq(N −
1)b > 0; while when rcN − c−G+ pq(N − 1)b < 0, it is stable.
For (x, y, z) = (0, 1− α, α), the Jacobian is
J =
[
a11 0
a21 a22
]
, (3.34)
where a11 = G−pq(N−1)(1−α)b, a21 = α(1−α)[pq(N−1)h+(1−pq)(N−1)B]−
(1−α)[G− pq(N − 1)(1−α)b], and a22 = α(1−α)(N − 1)[(1− pq)B + pqh− pqb],
thus the fixed equilibrium is stable when pqb > max{ G(N−1)(1−α) , (1− pq)B + pqh},
and it is unstable when pqb < max{ G(N−1)(1−α) , (1−pq)B+pqh}. Particularly, when
pqb = max{ G(N−1)(1−α) , (1−pq)B+pqh}, we find that one eigenvalue of the Jacobian
matrix at this fixed point is zero and the other one is negative. Accordingly, we study
its stability by further using the center manifold theorem30 as follows.
For 0 < α < 1, we know pqb 6= (1 − pq)B + pqh and max{ G(N−1)y , (1 − pq)B +
pqh} = G(N−1)y . In order to use the center manifold theorem conveniently, we take
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ξ = y − 1 + α, then the equation system becomes
x˙ = x(1− x)[G− pq(N − 1)(1 + ξ − α)b]− x(1 + ξ − α)[−(1− pq)
B(N − 1)(α− x− ξ)− pq(N − 1)(α− x− ξ)h− rc/N + c
+G− pq(N − 1)b(1 + ξ − α)],
ξ˙ = (1 + ξ − α)(α− ξ)[−(1− pq)B(N − 1)(α− x− ξ)
− pq(N − 1)(α− x− ξ)h− rc/N + c+G− pq(N − 1)b(1 + ξ − α)]
− x(1 + ξ − α)[G− pq(N − 1)b(1 + ξ − α)].
We further let M be a matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of J(0, 1− α, α)
which can be written as
M =
[a11−a22
a21
0
1 1
]
.
Then we have
M−1J(0, 1− α, α)M =
[
0 0
0 a22
]
.
We further take [u v]T = M−1[x ξ]T , and thus we have u = x/θ and v = ξ−x/θ
where we use the notation θ = a11−a22a21 . It leads to
u˙ = u(1− θu)[−(u+ v)pq(N − 1)b]− u(1 + u+ v − α)
× [−(1− pq)B(N − 1)(α− θu− u− v)− pq(N − 1)(α− θu− u− v)h
− rc/N + c− pq(N − 1)b(u+ v)].
Using the center manifold theorem, we have that v = e(u) is a center manifold. We
assume that e(u) = O(|u|2), which yields the reduced system
u˙ = −u2pq(N − 1)b+ θu3pq(N − 1)b+O(|u|4).
Since −pq(N − 1)b 6= 0, we know that the fixed point (u, e(u)) = (0, 0) is unstable
for the reduced system. Accordingly, the fixed point (0, 1− α, α) is unstable.
(2) For α ≤ 0 or α ≥ 1, the boundary equilibrium point of the DP edge does not
exist. Then the system has only three fixed points in the parameter space, namely,
(0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), and (0, 1, 0).
The fixed point (0, 0, 1) and (1, 0, 0) are both unstable since the largest eigenval-
ues of corresponding Jacobian matrices are both positive. If rcN −c−G+pq(N−1)b <
0, the fixed point (0, 1, 0) is stable, while it is a saddle point and becomes unstable
when rcN − c−G+pq(N −1)b > 0. Particulary, when rc/N − c−G+pq(N −1)b = 0
and (1− pq)B + pqh− pqb 6= 0, it is unstable.
4. Numerical examples
We now provide some numerical examples to confirm the above theoretical analysis.
We use the simplex S3 = {(x, y, z) : x, y, z ≥ 0, x + y + z = 1} to depict the
October 29, 2019 1:53 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE manuscript˙28-19-10
Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population 13
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 
 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Time
 C
 P
 D
P
CD
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. The evolution of cooperation in an environment in which the expected loss of defectors is
less than the expected bribe amount received by punishers. The triangle represents the state space
where the actual fractions of cooperators, defectors, and punishers are denoted ∆ = {(x, y, z) :
x, y, z ≥ 0 and x + y + z = 1}. Filled circle represents a stable fixed point whereas open circles
represent unstable fixed points. Panel (a) depicts that a stable interior equilibrium appears in the
simplex S3, which means that these three strategies coexist by maintaining a stable fraction in the
population. Panel (b) depicts the time series of the frequencies of three strategies C (cooperators,
black solid line), D (defectors, blue dot line), and P (pool punishers, red dash line). After an initial
transient the frequencies of the three strategies eventually stabilize. Initial conditions: (x, y, z) =
(0.8, 0.1, 0.1). Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1, G = 0.5, B = 0.5, h = 0.1, b = 0.8, q = 1, and
p = 0.8.
state space of above three strategies. Accordingly, the three homogeneous states C
(x = 1), D (y = 1), and P (z = 1) correspond to three corners of the simplex S3.
All of these are equilibrium points of the system (2.4). We first present numerical
cases when the system (2.4) has an interior equilibrium point. When β < 1, µ < 1,
and β + µ < 1, there is an interior fixed point. From the theoretical analysis we
know that its stability is determined by the relationship between the expected loss
(1−pq)B+pqh of defectors and the expected bribe amount pqb received by punishers.
4.1. Stable interior equilibrium point
In the following we present a numerical example to confirm that the system can have
a stable interior equilibrium point. As shown in Fig. 1(a), we see that there exist five
equilibria in the simplex S3. The existing interior equilibrium point is stable and all
interior orbits converge to this point, irrespective of the initial conditions. Besides,
a boundary equilibrium point between all defectors and all punishers appears on
the edge DP , which is unstable. Furthermore, the direction of the evolution on the
CP edge is from P to C, and from C to D on the CD edge. Figure 1(b) depicts the
time evolution of the frequencies of cooperators, defectors, and punishers. We can
see that all mentioned strategists can coexist when the system reaches the steady
state. Furthermore, the fraction of punishers is the highest, and the fraction of
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Fig. 2. The evolution of cooperation in a corrupt environment in which the expected loss of
defectors and the expected bribe amount received by punishers are equal. Panel (a) depicts that
there is an interior fixed point which is surrounded by periodic orbits in the simplex. Panel (b)
depicts a representative behavior when strategies are oscillating among C, D, and P states. Initial
conditions: (x, y, z) = (0.8, 0.1, 0.1). Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1, G = 0.5, B = 0.5,
h = 0.4, b = 0.4, q = 1, and p = 1.
defectors is the lowest.
It is worth noting that all these results above are consistent with the theoretical
results. In particular, when (1−pq)B+pqh−pqb < 0, the interior equilibrium point
is stable. And the boundary fixed point with z = α on DP edge can appear when
0 < α < 1. According to our theoretical analysis, we know that it is unstable since
G− pq(N − 1)(1− α)b > 0 (see Theorem 3.1 and Sec. 3.2.1).
4.2. Hamiltonian system
In this section we provide a numerical example to confirm that the system can
become a Hamiltonian system. In Fig. 2(a), we see that the existing interior equi-
librium point is a center surrounded by periodic orbits and the strategy evolution
trajectory displays a limit cycle. No boundary fixed points can be detected on the
three edges. And the direction of evolution on the DP edge is from D to P , from
P to C on the PC edge, and from C to D on the CD edge. Figure 2(b) depicts
that the frequencies of these three strategies display periodic oscillations in de-
pendence on time, which is corresponding to the limit cycle shown in Fig. 2(a).
All these results are in agreement with the theoretical prediction, namely, when
(1 − pq)B + pqh − pqb = 0 the interior fixed point is neutrally stable, and the
dynamic system is Hamiltonian (see Theorem 3.3 of Sec. 3).
The cyclical evolutionary scenario can be described as follows. If most players
are cooperators in the group, it is better to become a defector due to the social
dilemma. If defectors are prevalent, corrupt officials can get a lot of bribes from
a group of defectors, and thus the number of punishers increases. If most players
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Fig. 3. The evolution of cooperation in an environment in which the expected loss of defectors is
larger than the expected bribe amount received by punishers. Panel (a) depicts that the interior
equilibrium point turns into a repeller, and the interior curves of simplex S3 coverage to the
boundary of S3. Panel (b) depicts that the frequencies of these three strategies display growing
periodic oscillations. Initial conditions: (x, y, z) = (0.8, 0.1, 0.1). Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1,
G = 0.5, B = 0.5, h = 0.4, b = 0.4, q = 0.8, and p = 1.
are punishers, the bribes from a few defectors are usually small enough to subvert
cooperators dominance over punishers, and thus cooperators spread. If the number
of cooperators increases sufficiently, then the original cooperation dilemma returns.
It is worth noting that cooperative behavior can still emerge even in a completely
corrupt environment. As we set that p = q = 1, which means that all defectors
are willing to offer a bribe to punishers, and all punishers are corrupt officials. It is
inspiring to see that altruistic behavior can still be maintained due to the oscillations
recurrent increase in cooperation.
4.3. Heteroclinic cycle
We provide a numerical example to confirm that the heteroclinic cycle can exist in
our equation system. Figure 3(a) shows that there are four unstable fixed points in
the simple S3, and all interior curves of state space converge to the boundary of S3.
Besides, the direction of the evolution on the DP edge is from D to P , on the PC
edge is from P to C, while on the CD edge is from C to D. Figure 3(b) depicts
that the frequencies of the three strategies are oscillating and the amplitudes are
gradually growing, eventually forming periodic oscillations. This means that these
three strategies can be cyclically dominant in the population and can thus avoid
the collapse of cooperation. Note that these numerical results are in agreement
with the theoretical analysis which predicts that the population converges to a
stable heteroclinic cycle on the boundary of S3 for (1 − pq)B + pqh − pqb > 0,
rc
N −c−G > max{−(N−1)[(1−pq)B+pqh],−pq(N−1)b} and r < N (Theorem 3.4
of Sec. 3).
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Fig. 4. The evolution of cooperation in an environment in which the expected loss of defectors is
larger than the expected bribe amount received by punishers. Panel (a) depicts that the defection
has an evolutionary advantage over the two other strategies, and ultimately occupies the entire
population. Panel (b) illustrates the time evolution of cooperation, defection, and punishment in
the whole population. Initial conditions: (x, y, z) = (0.8, 0.1, 0.1). Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1,
G = 0.5, B = 0.5, h = 0.4, b = 0.2, q = 1, and p = 1.
4.4. Global stability of all-D state
Next we provide a numerical example to confirm that the equation system can
converge to the all-D state with global stability when the interior equilibrium point
is unstable. As shown in Fig. 4(a), there are five fixed points in the simplex S3. All
interior orbits coverage to the vertex D, which is a global stable equilibrium point.
In the boundary case the unstable equilibrium point on the DP edge reappears.
Besides, defectors can always do better than cooperators on the CD edge, and
cooperators have more advantages than punishers on the remaining CP edge. In
Fig. 4(b), we show how the frequencies of the three strategies evolve with time when
the initial fractions of cooperators, defectors, and punishers are 0.8, 0.1, and 0.1,
respectively. Finally the fraction of defectors reaches one. This numerical calculation
is in agreement with our theoretical prediction that the system converges on the
all-D state for rcN − c−G+ pq(N − 1)b < 0 (Sec. 3.2.1).
4.5. Boundary equilibrium point with the coexistence of defectors
and punishers
Finally we present a numerical example to confirm that there exists a stable bound-
ary equilibrium point with the coexistence of defectors and punishers. In Fig. 5(a),
we show that the system converges to the stable boundary equilibrium point on
the DP edge, irrespective of the initial conditions, which means that defectors and
punishers can coexist permanently in the population, while cooperators disappear.
Besides, the evolutionary direction on CD edge is from C to D, while it is from P
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Fig. 5. The evolution of cooperation in a corrupt environment in which the expected loss of
defectors is less than the expected bribe amount received by punishers. Panel (a) depicts that there
exists a stable boundary equilibrium point on PD edge, and all trajectories starting from different
initial conditions terminate onto this point. Panel (b) illustrates how the fractions of cooperators,
defectors, and punishers evolve in the population. Initial conditions: (x, y, z) = (0.8, 0.1, 0.1).
Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1, G = 0.5, B = 0.5, h = 0.1, b = 0.8, q = 1, and p = 1.
to C on the CP edge. Figure 5(b) shows that the fraction of cooperators gradually
reduces to zero, even though their initial frequency is relatively high. In parallel
the fraction of punishers finally reaches about 0.8, while the fraction of defectors
converges to about 0.2. These numerical results validate our theoretical analysis
based on which as long as the interior equilibrium does not exist, the boundary
fixed point on the DP edge is globally stable (Sec. 3.2.2).
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators into
the PGG and investigated their consequence on the evolution of cooperation and
punishment in infinite well-mixed populations. As a result, we have observed basi-
cally two different evolutionary scenarios. Namely, the competing strategies either
coexist by forming stable time-dependent fractions or they dominate each other in a
rock-scissors-paper game like manner. But for both cases the cooperative behavior
can be well preserved. We have further identified the conditions in which the two
dynamic behaviors can appear. We find that when the expected loss is less than
the related bribe amount, a stable coexistence state among these three strategists
can appear. In the alternative case, when these two quantity values are identical,
the replicator dynamical system can be reduced to a Hamiltonian system. Here a
center surrounded by closed orbits appears in the interior of the simplex S3, which
means that these three strategies are mutually restrained and exhibit periodic os-
cillations. When the expected loss is larger than the expected bribe amount, the
interior fixed point is unstable, and two different evolutionary dynamic behaviors
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can emerge, namely, stable heteroclinic cycle and global attractor D. The former
can guarantee that cooperators, defectors, and punishers are cyclically dominant in
the population, while the latter will lead to the collapse of cooperation.
The key feature of our model is that corruption may emerge stochastically, ei-
ther from the side of violators or from corrupt enforcers. This realistic assumption
can be modeled in infinite well-mixed populations by using replicator equations.
The study of such highly nonlinear equation systems is really challenging,24 but
we could manage a comprehensive and systematic theoretical analysis. We could
identify all equilibrium points and characterize their stability by appropriately lin-
earizing the equation system. In particular, when there are pure imaginary among
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian we cannot determine the stability of an equilibrium
point based only on the eigenvalues. Instead, we investigate its stability by utilizing
the center manifold theorem.10,30 Furthermore, we not only prove that the system
can exhibit the central limit cycle, but also theoretically confirm the existence and
stability of heteroclinic cycle.
Recently, Huang et al.29 investigated the effect of corruption on the evolution of
cooperation and punishment in a hierarchical society which is divided into civilians
and cops. Our present work, however, focuses on the evolutionary dynamics of
cooperation, defection, and punishment in an integrated society when corruption
is possible. Importantly, we consider that defectors probabilistically bribe enforcers
to avoid punishment and meanwhile pool punishers probabilistically accept a bribe
from defectors, which can reflect a realistic behavior manner of individuals in human
societies. This behavior was studied in a population where individuals play the
PGG with pool punishment,53 and thus provides an alternative, but reasonable
route to study the effects of corruption on collective actions of cooperation. Rather
unexpectedly, the introduction of corruption can stabilize cooperation, and more
interesting dynamic behaviors can be derived which may provide some implications
for designing sanctioning strategies to support the evolution of cooperation.
We point out that although cooperative behavior can occur in a corrupt envi-
ronment, the long-term existence of corruption will seriously harm the economy and
society as a whole. For example, one cross-cultural experiment involving thousands
of people worldwide showed that corruption not only deprives people of economic
prosperity and growth, but also jeopardizes their intrinsic honesty.45 We should
stress that our present model does not explicitly consider a strategy chance of an
anti-corruption control which could be an additional source of cooperation sup-
port. Such kind of extension could be the scope of future research. On the other
hand, however, although powerful anti-corruption monitoring and sanctioning have
been used to resolve the corruption problem, the effects of such measures are either
transient or uncertain.1,29,31,35,65 For example, Muthukrishna et al.35 found that
anti-corruption strategies are effective under some conditions, but can further de-
crease public good provisioning when leaders are weak and the economic potential
is poor even if these strategies are powerful. The failure of anti-corruption strate-
gies is related to many independent factors, and the most important factor may be
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that the reason why enforcers are apt to fall into corruption is unclear. A recent
experimental study has revealed the reason why the upper-class individuals behave
more unethically than lower-class individuals is that they are more favorable atti-
tudes toward greed.43 Consequently, the task how to design efficient anti-corruption
strategies for resisting the occurrence of corruption from the source remains an open
and challenging question.
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